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Taxation in Stockholders' Forgiveness of
Accrued Salaries
Ronald B. Cohen*
T IS FAIRLY WELL ESTABLISHED that cancellation of indebtedness
ordinarily will be treated as income to a debtor corporation
unless the debt was forgiven by a stockholder.' In the latter
case, the corporation normally treats the resulting benefit as a
contribution to capital.
This treatment does not seem unreasonable when the debt
owed to the stockholder was created by a transfer to the cor-
poration of money or property. However, there is a much more
delicate situation when the debt is the result of unpaid salaries,
interest, or other corporation expenses. In the typical case, these
items would have reduced the income of the corporation in the
year of accrual,2 but would not have been picked up as income
by the cash basis stockholder. Therefore, the effective result of
forgiveness of salaries and interest would be that a corporation
could eliminate tax on the amounts accrued, while the stock-
holders would have no tax until dissolution, at which time they
would receive a "return of capital" and pay only at the capital
gain rates.
The specific problem is not mentioned in the Code and is
likewise ignored in the Regulations. Consequently, a thorough
look at what the case law has been is needed to see how current
transactions of this nature are likely to be handled by the courts.
Case Law
When the Federal Income Tax was young, the collectors
had a very difficult time trying to convince judges that any
forgiveness of any debt could ever be called income to any
debtor. The regulations insisted that certain types of forgiveness
should be treated as income, but the courts continually opposed
this concept, saying that voluntary forgiveness was a gift.
3
Finally, in 1931, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Kirby Lumber Co.,4 and the confusion had begun. Although an
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1 § 61(a) (12), Int. Rev. Code of 1954; Reg. 1.61-12 (11/25/57).
2 The effect of accruals to stockholders owning more than 50% of the
outstanding stock is discussed below.
3 The leading case was Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170
(1926).
4 United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1 (1931). During the
course of a single year, the corporation issued bonds at par and bought
them back at a discount of $137,000.00. The Court held that this profit
must be considered income and not a gift.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
TAX OF FORGIVEN SALARIES
attempt was made at distinguishing Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Em-
pire,5 it was effectually overruled. Justice Holmes easily brushed
aside the long standing view of the courts by saying, "We see
no reason why the Regulations should not be accepted as a cor-
rect statement of law."
The problem of how to treat the cancellation of accrued,
previously-deducted expenses was first answered by the Circuit
Court in the Auto Strop6 case. The Commissioner argued strenu-
ously that since the corporation had deducted the expenses and
the cash basis, 100% stockholder never reported the income, an
unjust tax benefit would be realized unless the forgiveness was
deemed to be income.
In his decision, Circuit Judge Chase reasoned, "When the
indebtedness was cancelled, whether or not it was a contribution
to the capital of the debtor depends upon considerations entirely
foreign to the question of payment of income taxes in some
previous year."
This was the law until the very important case of Helvering
v. Jane Holding Corp.,7 the decision which promptly threw this
area of the law into a turmoil. In this case, the corporation owed
$2,500,000.00 in previously deducted interest to a cash basis trust
that was the sole stockholder. This debt was forgiven, creating
an enormous avoidance of income tax by the parties. In the
court's decision, the primary reason for forcing inclusion of the
cancellation as income was the tax benefit idea-that the items
which were deducted when accrued should be taxed when can-
celled.
The court did not, however, overrule the Auto Strop8 case,
but chose to distinguish it on the basis that the forgiveness by
the trust was actually not gratuitous but motivated by other
valid business reasons. As the law later developed this was
established as a sufficient cause for calling the forgiveness income.
Nevertheless, several important cases9 were decided based
on the premise that a tax benefit had been realized, on the
authority of Jane Holding Corp.10 In these cases, there was no
claim that the cancellations were non-gratuitous and they clearly
opposed the rule in the Auto Strop" case.
5 Supra, note 3.
6 Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., Inc. 74 F. 2d 226 (2d Cir.
1935).
7 109 F. 2d 933 (8th Cir. 1940) Cert den., 311 U. S. 672.
8 Commissioner v. Auto Strop Safety Razor Co., supra note 6.
9 Three of these cases were Beacon Auto Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42
B. T. A. 703 (1940); Howard Paper Co., Inc., v. Commissioner, 43 B. T. A. 545
(1941), Amsco-Wire Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 44 B. T. A. 717 (1942).
10 Supra, note 7.
11 Supra, note 6.
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However, not all the courts swallowed this idea. In re Triple
Z. Products, Inc.1 2 was decided shortly after the Jane Holding
Corp.13 case and took a completely opposite view. District Judge
Leibel stated in his opinion, "He [the Referee] cited the Jane
Holding Corporation case as ruling that the controlling factors
are the previous deductions offsetting income otherwise taxable
and the subsequent release of indebtedness before payment, the
means of cancellation being unimportant. I agree that they
should be the controlling factors, but the Regulations do not so
provide and the law of the Second Circuit is to the contrary." 14
In 1943 the Supreme Court decided Helvering v. American
Dental Co."5 case, which has been the leading case in the entire
forgiveness field since that time. Although the case did not in-
volve stockholders, the issues were clear and the results analo-
gous. For many years rent and interest had been accrued and
deducted. When the indebtedness was forgiven, the corporation
treated it as a gift. In upholding the taxpayer, the court felt
that no gratuitous cancellation could possibly be taxable.
The dynamic effect that this case had was evident in Brown
Cab Co., Inc.16 where accrued salaries were forgiven by stock-
holder-employees. The Tax Court vacated its prior decision in
the same case and held, on the authority of American Dental
Co.,17 that there was no income realized. No subsequent case
involving stockholders has varied from this holding.'8
The last important case concerning the problem was Com-
missioner v. Jacobson,19 which limited the broad scope of Ameri-
can Dental Co. 20 In that case the taxpayer bought back indebted-
ness from bondholders at far less than par. The court reasoned
that the difference was not a gratuitous forgiveness, but resulted
because the bonds were sold at the best available price. In
determining that the difference was taxable, the court laid down
the most significant rule to date: There must be donative intent.
Legislation
It is very likely that the resulting tax benefit arising from
stockholder's forgiveness is not an intended one. If carried to its
extreme, most closely held corporations could effectively trans-
12 27 A.F.T.R. 1164 (1940).
13 Supra, note 7.
14 A similar view was adopted in Carroll-McCreary Co., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 124 F. 2d 303 (2nd Cir. 1941).
15 318 U. S. 322 (1943).
16 1 T.C.M. 450 (1943).
17 Supra, note 15.
18 Another early case that followed American Dental Co. was Pancoast
Hotel Co., v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 362 (1943).
19 336 U. S. 28 (1949).
20 Supra, note 15.
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fer current profits into paid-in capital without ever subjecting
them to any income tax.
However, the Code21 has eliminated any chance of this
type of tax avoidance for most closely held corporations, merely
by saying that rent, salaries, interest, etc. accrued to majority
stockholders (attribution rules applying) cannot be deducted
unless paid within seventy-five days after the close of the cor-
porate year.
This eliminated the possibility of any one family using the
forgiveness angle as a means to save taxes. However, since the
"seventy-five day rule" applies only to holders of more that 50%
of the outstanding stock, what is to stand in the way of the cor-
porations and the stockholders where there are two, three, or
four equal owners? As far as Case Law, Code, or Regulations
are concerned, the answer is "nothing." Nevertheless, good old
common sense might discourage many from taking this course
where the forgiveness is the culmination of a scheme to effect
tax savings.
In the original drafting of the 1954 Code, Section 7622 pro-
vided a comprehensive treatment of all forgiveness of indebted-
ness which would have eliminated the tax benefit involving these
accruals. However, this provision was killed in committee with-
out explanation before reaching the floor of the Senate. The
Conference Committee, in a later bill,23 noted the elimination,
requiring that current rules be followed in this area.
Subchapter S Corporations
It seems probable that any of these rules which apply to
conventional corporations will be extended to those electing to
have their stockholders taxed directly.24 Consequently, an elect-
ing corporation that breaks even could show a loss by accruing
officers' salaries to stockholders. This loss could be currently
deducted from the income of the individuals, and forgiveness at
a later date would create income neither to the stockholders nor
to the corporation.
Conclusion
It seems that this area of the income tax law might represent
to some taxpayers an honest-to-goodness, old-fashioned loop-
hole; one that should be closed soon by statute or regulation.
However, until that day, all practitioners should be aware of its
existence, and of the two requirements which must be met be-
fore the benefits can be safely assured.
21 § 267, Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
22 HR Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. at 709 (1954).
23 HR 2534, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 23 (1954).
24 Subch. S, Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
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The first is that the accrual must be a bona fide one and not
set up with the expectation that it will be forgiven tax-free at
a later date. If that is done the expense is not deductible since
it is not an ordinary and necessary expense of the corporation.
The second is that there be a genuine donative intent.
Whether the desire to make a gift because of the beneficial tax
results shows "donative intent" cannot be answered here. It is
fairly certain, though, that the precarious financial position of
a corporation is a natural cause for a completely gratuitous
forgiveness.
Once both these requirements are met, it appears that for-
giveness of accrued, previously deducted expenses will not create
taxable income to the corporation.
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